



INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY BODY FOR AI

FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ONLY

26th September 2024

Strategic Peace Proposal

For the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

A Phased Approach to De-escalation, Compliance with
International Law, and AI Regulation

INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY BODY FOR AI

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Introduction

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly undermined regional stability, international peace, and the global humanitarian order. In response to the urgent need for a structured and enforceable solution, this proposal integrates strategic phased de-escalation measures, adherence to international legal standards, and the innovative application of artificial intelligence (AI) to foster a sustainable and lasting peace.

Prepared by the Chair of the International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI), this plan is grounded in principles outlined in the Geneva Conventions and other relevant international legal frameworks. With the implementation of upcoming global certifications, standards, and regulations established by IRBAI, further military operations in Ukraine will become not only unfeasible but strictly regulated. This is particularly critical with the advent of AI-enhanced weaponry, which will now require certification and approval by IRBAI before deployment in conflict zones. The IRBAI will have the authority to ban AI-powered weapons and defense companies from engaging its products and services in warfare, ensuring compliance with international safety standards and preventing escalation through unchecked technological warfare.

Without these initiatives led by the IRBAI, it is projected that the Ukraine-Russia conflict could persist for a minimum of 10 years and potentially expand into neighbouring countries, given the global geopolitical stakes. An unregulated AI arms race could exacerbate the conflict, causing significant economic harm to both the European Union and Russia and leading to the loss of millions of lives. Currently, the daily cost of the war in Ukraine is estimated at \$664 million, amounting to approximately \$20 billion each month. This does not include the expenses related to post-war reconstruction, inflationary adjustments, or financial restructuring.

It is imperative that both parties agree to this proposal and commit to its full execution in the interest of regional and international security, as only through this framework can long-term stability and compliance with international law be ensured.



Structured Framework for Comprehensive Peace Negotiation and Implementation

This proposal outlines a structured six-phase approach to comprehensive peace negotiations, designed to systematically address and resolve key issues in a sequential manner, ensuring lasting peace and security. Each phase builds upon the achievements of the previous one, with separate agreements to be signed at the completion of each phase. The focus of this document is on the initial three phases, which centre around strategic measures for territorial de-escalation, arms reduction, and security agreements negotiations:

Strategic Measures for Territorial De-Escalation, Arms Reduction and Security Agreements Negotiations:

- Phase I: Territorial De-escalation; Removal of All Long-Range Weapons, Cyberattacks Prevention, Sanctions Lift
- Phase II: Territorial De-escalation; Removal of All Mid-Range Weapons, Sanctions Lift
- Phase III: Ceasefire Agreement and Implementation, Security Agreements Negotiations, Sanctions Lift

Upon successful completion of Phase II, and during Phase III, the International Regulatory Body for AI will facilitate and expand negotiations by involving international organizations and states, which were excluded from Phase I, II negotiations. IRBAI will assist the governments of Russia and Ukraine in preparations for Phases IV, V, and VI which include:

Security and Peace Agreements

- Phase IV: Establishment of Demilitarized Zones; Black Sea Security Agreement; NATO-Ukraine-Russia Agreement; Eastern Europe Energy Security Agreement; Nuclear Weapons International Accords

Recovery

- Phase V: Establishment of Free Economic Zones; Procedures for Repatriations and Resettlements; Initiatives for Reconstruction, Reconciliation (dissolution of Anti-Russia and Anti-Ukraine movements, guarantees of “human rights”, including the “rights of Russian Orthodox”)
- Phase VI: Lifting of All Sanctions; Enabling Self-Determination-2035



Summary and Simplification of the Conflict

In March 2014, Crimea held a referendum in which voters were asked whether to join Russia or reinstate the 1992 Crimean constitution for greater autonomy within Ukraine. The referendum followed the political upheaval in Ukraine that led to the ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich. Official results indicated that approximately 97% of voters supported joining Russia. This outcome was largely influenced by the local demographics—primarily ethnic Russians and Tatars, who made up around 80% of the population— and the perception that aligning with Russia might bring economic benefits, such as higher employment rates and increased pension payments.

Soon after the results were publicized, the Ukrainian government submitted an application to the UN, alleging that Russian military forces were present during the referendum, leading to claims that the vote took place under duress. However, this statement was contested and viewed by some Crimeans as misleading, with no substantial evidence proving that voters were coerced.

The UN General Assembly did not recognize the Crimean referendum and passed Resolution 68/262 on March 27, 2014, deeming the referendum invalid as it was conducted without oversight from credible international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the UN itself. Additionally, the presence of Russian forces was cited as a factor undermining the legitimacy of the vote. It is important to note that General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding.

Following the referendum, Russia's handling of the transition of Ukrainian assets, particularly the transfer and nationalization of assets in Crimea, was widely criticized. The process was seen as rushed and unfair, especially to Ukrainian elites who lost significant investments and influence, exacerbating tensions. Some of these elites were themselves involved in corruption and had acquired assets through illegal means.

Instead of seeking diplomatic and socioeconomical solutions, the Ukrainian government, influenced by oligarchs who lost their assets in Crimea, responded by militarizing the situation. They deployed troops and armed local gang groups, which later evolved into formal military units. Some of these units received support from the U.S., further complicating the conflict. Few months later, in 2014, the Ukrainian government eventually cut off Crimea's water supply, affecting 2 million people, an action that has been heavily criticized and viewed by some as escalatory, some called it as an act of genocide. Russia was suddenly forced to deliver water in tanks and quickly started infrastructure projects to supply water to the starving Crimean population. The same year, Ukrainian government also punitively shifted from Russian to European gas imports, though much of this gas was still indirectly sourced from Russia anyway. As a result, the Ukrainian population had to pay significantly higher prices for "Russian" oil and gas. This led to inflation and exacerbated poverty further, causing 2 million Ukrainians to flee the country to Poland in the next 5 years. Since 2014, the sabotage of water pipelines has become increasingly common. Ukrainians have been reported to sabotage water pipelines in Donetsk and Luhansk, at times cutting off millions of people from access to fresh water. Additionally, attacks on the Russian-speaking population in these regions have also become more frequent.



Ukrainian government moves, aimed more at making political statements than addressing the actual needs of the population, have been criticized by both Ukrainians and Russians.

Eventually in May 2019 the population elected young Vladimir Zelensky, hoping he will bring peace to the region, get rid of the corruption and bring economic prosperity. Vladimir Zelensky had no prior experience in economics, policy, international relationships, nor had any understanding about global geopolitical framework. In June 2019, during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, Zelensky expressed Ukraine's commitment to pursuing NATO membership and emphasized the need for deeper cooperation between Ukraine and NATO to address regional security challenges, particularly Crimean Peninsula, which was always heavily populated by Russians.

On the other hand, Russia has not proposed any viable diplomatic solutions, such as joint sovereignty over Crimea—including specific arrangements like the Sevastopol Port Security for the Black Sea—or other forms of compromise that might have de-escalated the situation. This lack of diplomatic initiative has contributed to the prolongation of the conflict. The situation was further exacerbated by the withdrawal of the U.S. from key treaties, specifically the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in August 2019 and the Open Skies Treaty in November 2020. These actions shifted Ukrainian conflict from regional unrest to a global level of destabilization. War between Russia and Ukraine, which sought to join NATO, became inevitable.

Vladimir Putin tried to prevent the war and used diplomatic channels, in December 2021 Russia presented the U.S. and NATO with a series of security demands, which included legal guarantees that NATO would not expand eastward, particularly to include Ukraine and Georgia, the removal of NATO military infrastructure from Eastern European countries (particularly after US withdrawal from INF), limits on missile deployments and military exercises near Russia's borders. Joe Biden and Jen Stoltenberg refused the proposal.

Multiple rounds of diplomatic negotiations took place again in January 2022 between Russia, the U.S., NATO, and other Western nations. Russia reiterated its demands, while the U.S. and NATO rejected any limitations on NATO's open-door policy. In early February 2022, Russia continued to insist that NATO and Ukraine address its security concerns, while Ukraine and Western countries sought de-escalation but refused to concede on NATO expansion or Ukraine's sovereignty. Russia, in response to growing security concerns and President Zelensky's appeals for more weapons and NATO membership at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, 2022, eventually initiated what it termed a "Special Military Operation" on February 24, 2022, with the goal of changing the Ukrainian government and removing Vladimir Zelensky. Special Operations was initiated under the propaganda pretext of "de-Neo Nazification" to mobilize Russian soldiers psychologically and to avoid the civil unrest opposing special operation.

Russia's initial attack targeted Kyiv's airport, aiming to airlift special troops into the Ukrainian capital and swiftly seize government buildings with minimal civilian impact. Simultaneously, Russian aircrafts bombarded Ukrainian air defenses and fighter jets. Special operation was unsuccessful as Ukrainian forces quickly mounted a strong defense. In the face of the escalating conflict, President Zelensky responded by arming civilians and seeking further international



support by posting emotionally charged videos on social media and pretending that Russia is going to attack other countries, particularly Poland.

Additionally, “the deliberate absence of competent diplomacy” at the White House and NATO has not only perpetuated the conflict but also opened the door for external actors to financially exploit the situation. Reports suggest that private military contractors from the U.S. and the EU and influential political networks are using the ongoing strife to continue to push Ukraine towards NATO membership—a move that Russia vehemently opposes and will not allow due to the global geopolitical construct and current situation in the Middle East. As a defensive measure, Russia will continue its military presence to prevent Ukraine's NATO accession, adhering to NATO guidelines that a country engaged in active conflict cannot join the alliance.

Given the ongoing conflict, bolstered by Western weapons, Ukraine will likely be unable to join NATO for the foreseeable future, possibly decades. Despite this, the Ukrainian government remains optimistic about membership prospects. This situation perpetuates a dramatic and horrific reality for both Ukrainians and Russians and enables foreign military contractors to use Ukrainian territory and civilians to achieve their objectives.

The continued conflict underscores the diplomatic inadequacies of both governments, whose actions seem driven more by short-sighted political motives than by a strategic, well-considered approach to governance and international relations during the transition to multipolar world. This not only exacerbates the conflict but also drains resources and lives, highlighting the critical need for more competent and forward-thinking leadership outside of the governmental establishments.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Based on my experience and knowledge, I strongly believe that achieving lasting peace requires several critical steps. These include energy security agreements, demilitarization, Black Sea Security Agreements, Eastern European Security Agreements, and International Accords on Nuclear and Long-range Weapons.

Additionally, essential measures should involve changes in leadership, the implementation of educational programs in schools to promote reconciliation, the regulation of media platform to prevent the spread of propaganda that fosters hatred (including De-Nazification propaganda and the narrative that Russia poses an imminent threat to the EU). This approach will best serve the socio-economical interests of both Ukraine and Russia and will help ensure lasting peace in the region.



PHASE I

Strategic Measures for Territorial De-Escalation, Arms Reduction, Cyberattacks Prevention, Sanctions Lift

1. Goals

Removal of Long-Range Weapons and De-escalation signal compliance with international humanitarian law and reinforces global non-proliferation norms. Phase I is aimed at:

- a) Immediate De-escalation of the Ongoing Conflict
- b) Reduction in Military Expenditures
- c) Stabilization of Frontlines
- d) Confidence-Building Measures
- e) Reduction of Psychological Warfare
- f) Cyberattacks Prevention
- g) Minimization of Mass Displacements
- h) Preservation of Industrial and Economic Stability
- i) Minimization of Civilian Harm
- j) Protection of Civilian and Energy Infrastructure
- k) Creation of a Pathway for Comprehensive Peace Discussions

2. Prohibition and Removal of Specific Offensive Weapons

Upon approval of the proposal and the signing of the agreement for **Phase I** implementation, all parties agree to comply with the prohibition and removal of specific long-range offensive weapons and all thermobaric and vacuum weapon systems within 45 days. This will include the immediate cessation of use, followed by the withdrawal of long-range gliding bombs, tactical drones, long-range missiles, medium-range missiles, and offensive aviation assets from active operations.

All prohibited systems will be moved to pre-designated, secure storage facilities located at least 500 km from the frontlines and deactivated to ensure safety and trust.

Weapons Systems to be Prohibited and Removed:

- a) Gliding Bombs and Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs):
 - **Russia:** KAB (250, 500, 1000, 1500), and all Gliding Bombs and PGMs with a range exceeding 80km.
 - **Ukraine:** JDAM-ER, Storm Shadow/SCALP EG, AGM-154 JSOW, Taurus KEPD 350, and all Gliding Bombs and PGMs with a range exceeding 80km.



b) Long-Range Missiles:

- **Ukraine:** Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, JASSM AGM-158, Neptune Anti-Ship, and all Long-Range Missiles with a range exceeding 80km.
- **Russia:** Iskander-M, Mq, Iskander E, Iskander K, Kalibr (All models), Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-47M2, S 300, S 400, and all Long-Range Missiles with a range exceeding 80km.

c) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and Medium-Range Missiles:

- **Russia:** BM-21 Grad, Tornado-G, Smerch, and other MLRS with a range exceeding 80 km are also prohibited.
- **Ukraine:** Tochka-U, Smerch, Uragan, Himars, and all other MLRS with a range exceeding 80 km are also prohibited.

d) Tactical Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs):

- **Ukraine:** Bayraktar TB2, Punisher, UJ-22, AQ-400 Scythe, Switchblade 600, and Palianytsia, and all drones with a range exceeding 80 km.
- **Russia:** Shahed-136/131/129, Orion, Orlan-10, Lancet, Eleron-3, Garpyia-A1, and all drones with a range exceeding 80 km.

e) Fighter Jets:

- **Russia:** Su-35 and Su-30, Su-24 and Su-34, Tu-22M3, MiG-31K and all other fighter jets.
- **Ukraine:** MiG-29, Su-27, F16, and all other fighter jets.

f) Attack Helicopters:

- **Russia:** Ka (All Models) and MIL Mi (all models), and all other helicopters.
- **Ukraine:** Attack Helicopters: Mi-8, Mi-24, and all other helicopters

g) Thermobaric and Vacuum Weapons Systems:

- **Russia:** TOS-1, TOS-1A, RPO-A Shmel, RPO-M Shmel, FOAB 9M55S, AVBPM, and all other thermobaric and vacuum weapons systems.



- **Ukraine:** TOS-1A, and all other thermobaric and vacuum weapons systems.
- h) Anti-personnel landmines:
 - **Russia:** POM 3, POM 2, and all other anti-personnel landmines.
 - **Ukraine:** PMN1-, PMN-2, POM 2, POM 2R, and all other anti-personnel landmines.
- i) Cluster Munitions
 - **Russia:** 9N210 and 9N235 Submunitions, 3B30, RBK-500, PTAB-1M, and all other cluster munitions.
 - **Ukraine:** M864 DPICM, 9N210, 9N235, M26 DPICM, and all other cluster munitions.

3. Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

There shall be an absolute prohibition on the use of any chemical weapons in the conflict. This includes, but is not limited to:

- a) The use of white phosphorus munitions or any incendiary device containing phosphorus is strictly prohibited.
- b) The deployment of drones equipped with chemical agents, including chloropicrin, cyanogen chloride, or any other toxic substances, is fully banned.

It is essential that international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), be significantly reinforced to effectively carry out their roles in monitoring and enforcing prohibitions on chemical weapons. Given the available evidence suggesting the involvement of both parties in the use of chemical agents, these organizations must be empowered with additional resources and authority to ensure strict compliance with international law and to maintain transparency throughout the verification process.

4. Permitted Defensive Measures for the Protection of Civilian Infrastructure

The following air-defense systems shall be authorized to remain operational with the sole purpose of safeguarding civilian populations and critical infrastructure against aerial threats. Their deployment shall be strictly limited to defensive operations, operations shall be conducted under international oversight to ensure compliance:

- a) Air-Defense Systems:
 - **Ukraine:** S-300, S 400, Buk-M1, Patriot, SAMP/T, Gepard
 - **Russia:** Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2



- b) Short-Range Defensive Artillery and Missile Systems:
 - **Ukraine:** Stinger MANPADS, Piorun MANPADS
 - **Russia:** Igla MANPADS

5. Territorial De-escalation and Establishment of Protected Geofencing Zones

Parties shall agree that to effectively minimize casualties and contain the ongoing conflict, the establishment of No-Strike Zones is essential. These zones shall serve as conflict-limited areas, ensuring that both civilian and critical infrastructure remains safeguarded from military strikes.

Defining Conflict Zones:

- a) Conflict zone shall not extend beyond 80 km from active conflict frontlines. Beyond this buffer, air and artillery strikes must be strictly prohibited
- b) The Conflict zones can be dynamically adjusted if front lines shift, but the principle remains the same: No long-range attacks outside of the Conflict zone.

Defining No-Strike Zones

- a) Parties shall agree to designate and enforce No-Strike zones around all critical civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities, pipelines, oil refineries, water supply systems, schools, hospitals, religious sites, and all densely populated residential areas.

6. Prohibition of Cross-Border Strikes

To ensure the integrity of the Phase I de-escalation efforts, both parties shall agree to a complete prohibition on any strikes outside the agreed-upon conflict zones. Specifically:

- a) Ukraine shall not launch any strikes against Russian territory, excluding the current conflict zones defined in the agreement.
- b) Russia shall not launch any strikes against Ukrainian territory, excluding the current conflict zones defined in the agreement.

This prohibition includes artillery strikes, airstrikes, missile launches, and drone attacks. Any violation of this agreement will be considered a material breach of the Phase I Agreement and may result in immediate penalties.

7. Cyber Warfare and AI-Driven Offensive Systems

As part of Phase I, this proposal explicitly prohibits all forms of cyber-attacks targeting infrastructure, such as banks, energy grids, nuclear plants, water supply systems, hospitals,



and communication networks. The increasing use of AI-driven offensive cyber systems poses a significant threat to civilian security and the stability of essential services. To ensure the safety of civilians and prevent the disruption of vital infrastructure, the International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI) will deploy a comprehensive Cyber and AI Threat System (CATS). This system will use AI-powered detection algorithms to continuously monitor and neutralize potential cyber threats in Russia and Ukraine in real-time.

After ceasefire is achieved, the Russian and Ukrainian government shall authorize IRBAI Cybersecurity team to install its monitoring software solely on the end points of civilian infrastructure, allowing the system to protect key assets while maintaining national sovereignty over installations. IRBAI's cybersecurity teams will integrate the monitoring framework with national security agencies to cover essential civilian services, ensuring that any attempts to launch cyber-attacks are detected and mitigated before harm can occur. The cybersecurity teams will also conduct routine penetration testing, issue threat alerts, and respond to incidents by disabling hostile AI systems and neutralizing active cyber threats.

Additionally, to further safeguard against physical sabotage, all critical pipeline infrastructure (e.g., gas and oil pipelines) will be required to have sensors installed to monitor real-time conditions, detecting any tampering or disruptions. All nuclear power plants will be required to install jamming technologies to protect the assets against aerial sabotage.

IRBAI's cybersecurity teams will also issue threat alerts, respond to incidents by disabling hostile AI systems, and neutralize active cyber threats. Any confirmed cyberattacks or sabotage attempts will be treated as violations of the Phase I Agreement and will be subject to prosecution under international and national laws.

8. Implementation of Compliance and Verification Mechanisms for Phase I

Once parties approve Phase I and sign the agreements:

- a) The International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI) will establish offices in both Moscow and Kiev to facilitate communication between the two countries and support the peacekeeping mission. These offices will also play a key role in implementing AI technologies aimed at preventing future conflicts.
- b) IRBAI will ensure the creation of direct communication lines between government officials and military commanders to efficiently manage incidents and swiftly de-escalate any potential confrontations.
- c) Upon the establishment of operations of the International Regulatory Body for AI in Kiev and Moscow, IRBAI will employ AI Compliance systems and satellite imagery for



real-time monitoring of conflict zones to detect any unauthorized deployment or use of prohibited weapons that utilize AI.

- d) During peacekeeping mission, observers, including United Nations Department of Peace Operations, NATO Monitoring and Verification division, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe will monitor compliance with the withdrawal of prohibited weapons and the use of permitted defensive systems, as well as the operational military compliance with No-Strike and Conflict zones. Third Parties will oversee compliance with the agreements through satellite monitoring, drones, and ground-based inspections.
- e) All monitoring parties will establish a regular reporting mechanism to provide updates on the status of weapon withdrawals and compliance with the established rules of engagement. Reports will be delivered directly to Russian Ministry of Defense, Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

9. Penalties for Non-Compliance

- a) Both parties will sign formal agreement not to redeploy long-range weapons to conflict areas and within 500 km from front lines and national borders.
- b) Continuous monitoring through satellite surveillance, ground inspections, and intelligence sharing will be conducted to ensure no attempts are made to reactivate or redeploy the removed long-range weapons systems. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Regulatory Body for AI will continuously monitor the implementation and the compliance with the Phase I agreement for the next 10 years.
- c) Any state that violates the Phase I Agreement by redeploying prohibited weapons will be subject to military embargoes imposed by the international community.
- d) Individuals, including state officials or military commanders, involved in the redeployment of prohibited weapons will be subject to prosecution under international and national law.
- e) Violations of established no-strike zones around critical infrastructure and civilian areas will result in legal prosecution by designated national enforcement agencies.

10. Accountability for Incitement of Conflict and Escalation:

To ensure the long-term success of the peace process, individuals who are directly responsible for the escalation of conflict, those who deliberately halt negotiations, or those who disrupt efforts for a peaceful resolution by inciting the use of AI-powered military weapons will be subject to prosecution. This includes, but is not limited to:

- a) Politicians and government officials.



- b) Corporate leaders, including individuals responsible for defense contracting and military technologies.

Incitement to mass murder is defined as:

- the deliberate encouragement of military aggression,
- the use of hate speech to promote violence,
- and the intentional disruption of peace negotiations.

IRBAI will play a critical role in monitoring communications, media outputs, and Bot and AI-generated propaganda to identify any actions that incite hatred, violence, or mass murder. This includes tracking deliberate attempts to derail peaceful negotiations or escalate military actions. Through its advanced AI technologies, IRBAI will ensure that these harmful behaviours are brought to light and addressed swiftly.

11. Prohibition on Participation of Politicians with Defense Investments:

To ensure the integrity and impartiality of the peace process, any politicians or government officials who hold direct or indirect investments in defense companies that supply AI-powered military technologies or other weapons that utilize AI in the Ukraine-Russia conflict will be prohibited from participating in any way in peace negotiations.

- a) These individuals will be barred from providing advice or directly contacting the heads of the Ukrainian and Russian governments during the negotiations (Phase I to Phase V).
- b) This measure is designed to prevent any conflict of interest that could result in the prolongation of the conflict for personal financial gain.

To enforce this prohibition, the International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI) Cybersecurity Team will monitor communications and provide evidence of any violations. Any individuals found to be in breach of this rule will face international sanctions and be referred to national enforcement agencies for prosecution under relevant conflict-of-interest laws.

This provision ensures that those involved in peace negotiations act solely in the interest of peace and not for personal or financial gain through military-industrial complex investments.

12. Exclusion of Countries with Financial or Geopolitical Interests

To ensure the impartiality of the peace negotiations, any country that profits either financially or geopolitically from the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict will not be permitted to participate in Phase I, II of the peace negotiation process facilitated by the International Regulatory Body for AI.



- a) Heads of countries with significant economic interests in the sale of weapons, military technologies (especially those involving AI), or those that have pursued geopolitical gains during the conflict shall be excluded from advising or directly contacting the heads of the Ukrainian and Russian governments in relation to peace negotiations for a period of 7 days prior to the signing of Phase I, II Agreements.

This measure is designed to prevent external influence that could prolong the conflict or skew negotiations for strategic advantage, rather than prioritizing peace.

11.1 Identified Countries & Conflict of Interests. Reasons for Exclusions:

United States

- U.S. pressure on European allies to abandon Russian gas in favor of American LNG could further alienate European nations, complicating the peace process.
- US Defense firms like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman have experienced heightened demand for military equipment in Europe and Ukraine, enhancing their revenues significantly.
- The U.S.'s provision of military aid to countries like Israel, despite reports of human rights violations, war crimes and terrorism, points to a disregard for international law. The Leahy Law, which prohibits aid to military units involved in gross human rights abuses, has been arguably overlooked, reinforcing the perception that the U.S. acts primarily in its own interests.
- Support for Ukraine has solidified the U.S.'s ties with NATO allies, augmenting its influence in Eastern Europe while concurrently undermining Russia's position. This could destabilize the Region for the benefit of US economy.
- The United States has a history of military interventions that prioritize strategic and economic interests over peace. These interventions, including those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, have often led to prolonged conflicts lasting decades, rather than resolutions. This track record raises doubts about the U.S.'s ability to act as an unbiased mediator in peace processes.
- Disproportional sanctions and capital freezes against Russia benefit the US

Poland

- As a frontline NATO member, Poland has received increased security guarantees and military investments, strengthening its strategic importance and economic security.



- The opening of the Baltic Pipe and the fallout from the Nord Stream pipeline disruptions have positioned Poland as a pivotal energy transit hub for Norwegian gas.

Norway

- Norway has emerged as a major supplier of natural gas to Europe, filling the void left by diminished Russian gas supplies, which has significantly boosted revenues for Norwegian energy firms.

United Kingdom

- Post-Brexit, the UK has endeavoured to reinforce its international standing, particularly in defense and security sectors, supporting Ukraine to align with these objectives.
- London's financial sector has benefited from managing significant asset flows exiting Russia due to sanctions.

Germany

- Germany's alignment with NATO's collective defense stance could be perceived as biased or confrontational, potentially complicating direct negotiations.

Switzerland

- Switzerland has frozen significant assets related to Russian and Ukrainian entities and government officials, potentially impacting its perceived neutrality in the conflict.
- The involvement in managing and potentially repatriating frozen assets complicates its position, as these actions could be viewed as taking sides in the conflict

China

- China could potentially capitalize on the gaps created by Western sanctions against Russia, especially in terms of energy purchases and by securing increased influence over Russian natural resources.

**Belarus**

- Belarus has hosted Russian military operations and benefited from strengthened military and strategic ties, alongside economic support and energy subsidies.

Hungary

- Heavily reliant on Russian gas, Hungary has maintained favourable energy agreements with Russia to ensure economic stability and manage domestic energy costs.

Serbia

- With strong cultural and religious ties to Russia, Serbia has supported Russian positions on international issues such as Kosovo's independence and benefited from favourable energy terms.

11.2 Neutral Parties Recommended for Negotiations

The International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI), in collaboration with relevant international organizations, will oversee compliance to ensure that only neutral parties dedicated to peace and de-escalation are allowed to participate in the negotiation process. Any violations of this provision may result in severe trade sanctions being imposed by either Ukraine or Russia.

Countries that are particularly concerned with Black Sea security and that would significantly benefit from a peaceful resolution to the conflict are invited to participate in the negotiations. These countries, recognized for their impartiality in the process, include:

- **Turkey**
- **Moldova**
- **Georgia**
- **Romania**

12. Compliance and Sanctions Relief

We propose that sanctions relief will be provided incrementally as compliance with Phase I Agreement is verified by International Regulatory Body for AI and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Russia and Ukraine. Compliance will need to be sustained for a period of a minimum 90 days.



Sanctions will only be lifted following monthly compliance reports submitted by International Regulatory Body for AI and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, confirming that no violations have occurred in the minimum period of 90 days after the completion of Phase I. Reports will be submitted to:

- a) The European Union Sanctions Committee
- b) European Council
- c) U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC
- d) The Russian and Ukrainian Governments
- e) Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication and its Member States and Member Financial Institutions
- f) Other relevant international stakeholders involved in the peace process.

Russia - Sanctions Relief

The International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI) recommends that the first phase of sanctions relief should focus on the restoration of SWIFT access for Russian financial institutions. This relief will be contingent on Russia's continued and verifiable adherence to the terms of the Phase I Agreement and will be implemented gradually over a period of 90 days, with regular compliance verification conducted by international monitoring agencies.

Additional Notes:

The exclusion of Russian banks from the SWIFT network has significantly contributed to global economic polarization. As the world transitions towards a multipolar international system, prolonging this exclusion risks deepening geopolitical divides and heightening tensions, which could undermine global stability. Restoring SWIFT access in a controlled manner would help rebuild international economic cooperation, thereby mitigating the risk of further conflicts and preventing potential global financial instability, particularly a crisis linked to the devaluation of the USD and collapse of the US economy by hyperinflation.

Furthermore, to safeguard global economic stability, the BRICS Pay system should be fully implemented as a secondary international payment network without exclusions. This would provide an alternative to SWIFT and prevent economies from experiencing total collapse due to disproportionate economic sanctions imposed by individuals politically motivated who do not specialize in finance or economics. Such measures are critical in protecting civilians from the consequences of economic isolation, as seen in prior cases of "incompetent" sanctions that have exacerbated poverty and displacement of innocent civilians.

Sanctions against Russia, such as those imposed during the tenure of Andrea Gacki, then Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on April 15, 2021, and February 22, 2022, were implemented before the military conflict in Ukraine and have been criticized as



disproportionate. These sanctions are believed to have contributed to the escalation of tensions and, ultimately, the military conflict. In addition, similar sanctions on Venezuela under her leadership led to severe humanitarian consequences, including the displacement of 7 million people who were forced to flee the country, contributing to illegal immigration into the U.S. and further unrest in Venezuela. It is vital that no single individual should wield the power to make decisions that affect millions of lives without thorough economic expertise and international oversight.

Additionally, the lack of sanctions on Israel, despite its involvement in war crimes, genocide, and its implication in acts of terror in Lebanon, is deeply concerning. This inconsistency could be seen as fraudulent, suggesting that the sanctions imposed on Russia are not based on a fair or impartial application of international law.

Ukraine- Shift from Military Aid to Economic Assistance

The International Regulatory Body for AI further proposes that, instead of additional offensive military equipment, the Ukrainian government should receive the pledged funds previously committed by the international donors, in particular the US. These funds, initially allocated for the purchase of military supplies from offshore contractors that have not been fully delivered to Ukraine and won't be delivered until 4th Q 2025, shall be redirected to support Ukraine's economic recovery, infrastructure rebuilding, and humanitarian aid efforts. Direct deposit of funds in Ukrainian Banks would stabilize its economy and speed up post war recovery.

As part of this shift in focus, Ukraine should also receive needed 20 Patriot PAC-3 air defence systems instead of offensive weapons. These systems will be crucial for defending critical infrastructure and protecting civilian populations from missile threats, allowing Ukraine to prioritize defensive measures while focusing on rebuilding the country and stabilizing its economy .

Additional Notes:

There will be no need for offensive systems, in Phase IV the International Regulatory Body for AI and UN Peacemaking will supervise the establishment of Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) and Geofencing zones separating Russia and Ukraine. This will significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict reemerging therefore there will be no need for offensive weapons.

In Phase IV of the peace process, additional security agreements will be signed to provide comprehensive security arrangements for Ukraine and Russia, ensuring their protection and sovereignty through international cooperation, defensive systems, and long-term peacebuilding initiatives.



PHASE II Strategic Measures for Territorial De-Escalation and Arms Reduction, Sanctions Lift

1. Goals

Phase II aims to:

- a) Stabilizing front lines
- b) Reducing military expenditures
- c) Reduce the area of active conflict, and build upon the progress made in Phase I.
- d) Prohibition of mid-range weapons and military drones,
- e) The establishment of protected geofencing
- f) Protecting both civilian and energy infrastructure
- g) Creating a pathway for comprehensive peace discussions
- h) Progressive lift of all sanctions

2. Reduction of Conflict Zone

After the finalization of 45 day-Phase I:

- a) the conflict zone shall be reduced from 80 km to 40 km from active frontlines. This reduction is intended to further contain military operations and limit the scope of the battlefield.
- b) No air or artillery strikes shall be permitted outside this 40 km zone. A pattern of more than 20 violations by any party shall be considered a material breach of the Phase II Agreement.
- c) IRBAI will create an incident prevention communication mechanism between military commanders on both sides to address potential breaches or misunderstandings quickly and de-escalate situations before they escalate.
- d) If any violations are detected, the IRBAI will issue a joint alert to military commanders, followed by a 72-hour period review to resolve the breach.

3. Prohibition of Military Drones

Upon approval of the proposal and the signing of the Agreement for Phase II implementation, all parties will be required to comply with the prohibition and removal of specific mid-range offensive weapons within 45 days. This includes the immediate cessation of use and subsequent withdrawal of all tactical drones, including those used for combat, surveillance for attack planning, or other offensive purposes, as well as mid-range missiles from active conflict zones. Weapons systems shall be moved to pre-designated, secure storage facilities located at least 250 km from the front lines. All prohibited drones shall be deactivated, disassembled, and relocated to storage facilities, ensuring they cannot be redeployed.



A list of prohibited drones for each party includes:

- **Ukraine:** R18 Octocopter, DJI Mavic Series (All modified versions), Leleka-100, RAM II Loitering Munition, Vampire bomber, Dragon Drone, Switchblade 300, PPDS, and all custom-built offensive military drones.
- **Russia:** Orlan-10, Shahed-136A and B/131, Lancet Drone, Forpost , Eleron-3, ZALA 421-16E, KUB-BLA, Takhion, Granat-4, Supercam S350, and all custom-built offensive military drones

It is important to note that the International Regulatory Body for AI explicitly prohibits the production and use of military drones capable of discharging or spraying fire, in addition to those equipped with firearms or gas-emitting devices.

4. Permitted Military Drones

- a) Both parties are authorized to utilize jamming drones, strictly for defensive purposes in accordance with international guidelines.
- b) Drone operations for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions are permitted, as long as they remain in compliance with the agreed terms of the conflict.
- c) All drones must remain unarmed and will be subject to continuous international oversight to ensure their use is aligned with the peace agreement.

5. Implementation of Drone Jamming Technologies

Deployment of Drone Jamming Systems:

- Drone Jamming Systems can be deployed in the conflict zone and adjacent areas to neutralize unauthorized drone activity. This will help ensure compliance with the Phase II Agreement and prevent the use of drones for offensive military operations.
- Parties are allowed to use jamming technologies, anti-drone guns, lasers, or nets to physically disable enemy drones during Phase II. These measures are intended to contain any escalations related to drone usage.

International Oversight:

- The International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI), along with the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO), will be responsible for coordinating and monitoring these operations to ensure compliance.
- If necessary, the IRBAI will coordinate with electronic warfare (EW) units from both Ukrainian and Russian forces to deploy a wider range of countermeasures. These measures may include spoofing enemy drones, and more advanced electronic warfare tactics to ensure compliance with the terms of the Phase II Agreement.



- The UNDPO could deploy additional jamming drones or establish no-fly zones for offensive drones as part of its broader peacekeeping and de-escalation efforts. This will reinforce the commitment to maintaining drone-free zones around conflict areas.

6. Prohibition of Mid-Range Missiles and MRLS

In accordance with the Phase II Agreement, all parties will be required to comply with the use prohibition and removal of the following short- and mid-range offensive weapons within 45 days of signing. These systems shall be relocated to pre-designated secure storage facilities at least 250 km from the conflict zone and deactivated to ensure compliance.

A list of prohibited missiles for each party includes:

- **Ukraine:** Grad (BM-21), GMLRS (HIMARS), Neptune Anti-Ship Missile
- **Russia:** Grad (BM-21), Fath-360, Kh-31, Kh-59, Kh PLA, BM-27 Uragan
And any other Mid-Range missiles not listed above

7. Establishment of Protected Drone Geofencing and No-Strike Zones:

No-Strike Zones previously designated around all critical civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities, pipelines, oil refineries, water supply systems, schools, hospitals, religious sites, and densely populated residential areas remain the same. Furthermore:

- a) Any violations within the No-Strike Zones will lead to automatic military embargoes and sanctions under international law
- b) Advanced AI-driven geofencing technologies will be deployed to automatically detect and disable drones operating outside permitted zones

8. Monitoring and Compliance Mechanisms

- a) Compliance with the Phase II agreement will be monitored by IRBAI, OSCE, and UN peacekeepers, who will continue to employ satellite monitoring, drone surveillance, and ground-based inspections to ensure that all offensive Mid-Range Weapons are removed and prohibited zones are respected.
- b) Violations of the agreement will result in severe penalties, including military embargoes, financial sanctions, and prosecutions under national and international law.



9. Further Sanctions Relief - Restoration of Energy Trade and Security Agreement

IRBAI proposes the introduction of new sanctions relief upon the successful completion and compliance with Phase II, as well as the formal signing of the Energy Security Agreement (Phase III negotiations). Sanctions relief in the energy sector is the most effective way to stabilize both Ukraine and Russia during the conflict, not only by limiting the probability of attacks on the energy infrastructure but will also contain the military conflict to 40 km range and provide the reassurance that compliance within the Agreements is more achievable.

The focus on lifting energy sanctions not only addresses immediate humanitarian needs but also serves as a strategic move to fast-track economic recovery, reduce the risk of further infrastructure damage, and encourage peacebuilding through economic interdependence.

Additionally, ensuring energy trade stability will more likely stabilize the local currencies, preventing inflationary factors.

The energy sectors of both countries have sustained severe damage due to attacks, particularly targeting oil refineries, gas storage, and critical energy infrastructure. Both sides have attacked each other's energy infrastructure, leading to unstable energy supplies in the region. Lifting sanctions on energy trade, coupled with international monitoring of pipelines with AI technology, will help ensure that energy facilities in both Russia and Ukraine are no longer targeted. Also, gas and oil deliveries between the countries and neighbouring countries can resume at cheaper rates, commodities could be delivered more effectively without risk of causing harm to the environment. Neighbouring countries will benefit significantly.

Conditional on Russia's compliance with the Phase I and II Agreements, as well as the formal signing of the Energy Security Agreement, the international community shall begin the gradual restoration of energy exports within 90 days.

If Ukraine complies with the terms of Phase I, II, by not attacking refineries and oil deposits, nuclear plants and allowing a safe and secure environment for energy transit, it could receive priority access to energy markets within 90 days at a discount rate and additional financial assistance to rebuild its energy infrastructure could be provided from established Reconstruction Fund (Phase V).



PHASE III Ceasefire Agreement and Implementation, Security Agreements Negotiations, Sanctions Lift

1. Goals

Structured approach in Phase III builds upon the historical successes of Phase I and II implementations. By aligning with internationally recognized practices and employing advanced technologies, this phase aims to:

- a) Consolidate the progress
- b) Bring stability to the region
- c) Freeze the conflict with the objective of maintaining peace
- d) Establish a framework to sustain conflict freeze for up to 10 years, leading to self-determination referendums in Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea, and Zaporizhia
- e) Curtail the regional arms race
- g) Lay the groundwork for the cessation of current security pacts and initiate negotiations for new security frameworks
- h) Implement continuous satellite monitoring and oversight, managed by third parties, including OSCE and IRBAI, to ensure the ceasefire remains in effect.

2. Immediate Ceasefire Enactment

An immediate ceasefire shall be enforced across all conflict zones upon the signing of the Phase III Agreement confirming the End of War. Hostilities between Russia and Ukraine shall cease without delay, with all parties agreeing to respect the terms of the ceasefire as outlined below:

- a) Any violations could result in penalties and embargoes
- b) IRBAI and OSCE shall oversee compliance with real-time AI-based satellite monitoring, ensuring violations are immediately detected and addressed
- c) Additionally, the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) shall be deployed immediately for peacekeeping support, while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) shall be deployed to ensure the protection of civilian areas and the respect of humanitarian laws

3. Humanitarian Measures and Rights

Both parties must ensure the implementation and respect for the right to surrender, adhering to international humanitarian law. This includes guaranteeing humane treatment and legal protections for all combatants who choose to lay down their arms.



Internationally supervised humanitarian corridors must be established and maintained. These corridors will facilitate the safe evacuation of civilians and the seamless delivery of humanitarian aid, monitored to ensure their sanctity and safety from hostilities.

4. Strategic Troop and Armament Management

A phased reduction in troop deployments along the established front lines will be orchestrated through mutually agreed military disengagement plans, overseen by the OSCE and the UN.

A structured 45-day timeline for the withdrawal of all categorized heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery units, and other armoured vehicles, must be implemented. This operation will be monitored by international peacekeeping forces to ensure compliance and prevent re-escalation. Specific heavy weapons for withdrawal include:

Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Armoured Vehicles:

- **Russia:** BMP series (BMP-2, BMP-3), MT-LB, and BTR series (BTR-80, BTR-82), and all other models are also prohibited.
- **Ukraine:** BTR series (BTR-3, BTR-4), KrAZ Spartan and Kozak, Otokar Cobra, Humvee, and all other models are also prohibited.

Tanks:

- **Ukraine:** T-64, T-84, BM Oplot, T-72M, and all other models are also prohibited.
- **Russia:** T-72 (various models including T-72B3M and T-72M), T-90 (including T-90M advanced models), T-80, and all other models are also prohibited.

Howitzers:

- **Russia:** 2S1 Gvozdika, 2S19 Msta, 2A65 Msta-B, D-30, M109, and all other models are also prohibited.
- **Ukraine:** Krab (152mm), M777 (155mm), DANA (152mm), FH70 (155mm), Caesar (155mm), 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, 2S3 Akatsiya, and all other models are also prohibited.

Heavy Artillery:

- **Russia:** 2S7 Pion heavy artillery (203mm), 2S4 Tyulpan self-propelled mortars (240mm), and all other models are also prohibited.



- **Ukraine:** Panzerhaubitze 2000 (PzH 2000) (155mm), and all other models are also prohibited.

Mortars:

- **Russia:** 120mm and 82mm mortars (various models)
- **Ukraine:** 120mm and 82mm mortars (various models)

All heavy weapons must be relocated to storage facilities situated at least 250 km from agreed frontlines and borders. Any military activity in violation will be treated as a breach of the ceasefire, leading to immediate penalties.

5. Permitted Defensive Measures

The following defense systems shall always remain operational with the sole purpose of safeguarding against all aerial threats, their deployment shall be strictly limited to defensive operations:

c) Air-Defense Systems:

- **Ukraine:** S-300, S 400, Buk-M1, Patriot, SAMP/T, Gepard
- **Russia:** Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2

d) Short-Range Defensive Artillery and Missile Systems:

- **Ukraine:** Stinger MANPADS, Piorun MANPADS
- **Russia:** Igla MANPADS

e) Jamming Drones and Electronic Warfare Systems:

Both sides are permitted to deploy jamming drones and other electronic warfare systems to neutralize unauthorized drone activity. These systems must be used solely for defensive purposes to disable enemy drones and must be operated under international oversight to ensure compliance with ceasefire terms.

f) Drone Jamming Technologies:

Both sides may use anti-drone guns, lasers, nets, and signal jammers to physically or electronically disable enemy drones, strictly for the defense of civilian infrastructure or military installations in compliance with international oversight.



6. No Strike Zones

No-strike zones shall remain enforced around critical civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities, pipelines, oil refineries, water systems, educational institutions, healthcare facilities, religious sites, and densely populated residential areas.

7. Prisoner of War (POW) Exchanges

The exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) shall be promptly initiated under the auspices and guidance of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ensuring treatment in accordance with international conventions.

All prisoners of war must be exchanged.

8. Advanced AI Monitoring and Compliance Enforcement

IRBAI will continue to deploy advanced AI and geospatial technologies to monitor adherence to the ceasefire in real-time, ensuring that all parties respect the designated secure zones.

9. Establishment of Demilitarized Zones and Conflict Freeze

Demilitarized zones (DMZs) shall be established in key southern territories, which will be subject to a 10-year conflict freeze. During this period, these territories will not belong to either Russia or Ukraine. The purpose of this arrangement is to ensure that reconstruction efforts can proceed without the threat of renewed hostilities and to create a stable environment for long-term peace.

Both parties shall refrain from deploying any military forces within these zones, and international peacekeeping forces, under the authority of the United Nations (UN) or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), will be responsible for ensuring compliance. This peacekeeping mission will include regular surveillance and compliance reporting, to prevent violations of the demilitarized status.

To address the governance of the southern territories during the 10-year conflict freeze, it's essential to establish a neutral, internationally overseen governance structure that ensures the effective administration of the region while preventing undue influence from either Russia or Ukraine. Here's how you could incorporate the governance element:

- a) Establishment of Temporary Governance for the Southern Territories during Conflict Freeze



During the 10-year conflict freeze, a neutral, internationally supervised governing body shall be established to administer the southern territories. This governing body shall be responsible for managing the day-to-day administration, overseeing reconstruction efforts, ensuring the protection of civilian rights, and maintaining the neutrality of the region. The governing body will be composed of representatives from neutral international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as regional representatives selected through a non-partisan, transparent process.

The governing body will have the authority to:

- Oversee reconstruction projects funded by the Reconstruction Fund.
- Administer public services, including healthcare, education, infrastructure development, and environmental protection.
- Ensure the protection of human rights and the rule of law, preventing any abuse or discrimination during the conflict freeze.
- Manage local law enforcement in coordination with international peacekeeping forces, ensuring safety and order in the region.
- Coordinate investment projects from Russia and Ukraine, ensuring compliance with the regulations set for the 10-year conflict freeze, such as the capital gains tax exemption and foreign ownership restrictions.

b) Investment and Economic Development during Conflict Freeze

Only Russian citizens and Ukrainian citizens will have the right to ownership in the southern territories during the 10-year period to support reconstruction and economic development. To incentivize such investments, all capital gains from investments in these territories will be excluded from taxation during the conflict freeze. Furthermore, once the 10-year period ends and the region has voted on its political future, ownership of assets will remain intact, and nationalization of these assets will not be permitted. This guarantees legal protection for both Russian and Ukrainian investors and encourages long-term investment.

c) Self-Determination and Future Status

After the 10-year period of full reconstruction, funded by the Reconstruction Fund for both Russia and Ukraine, the populations of the southern territories will have the right to a self-determination vote. They will be able to choose whether to:

- Join the European Union as part of Ukraine,
- Join Russia, or
- Remain independent and form their own government.



This vote will be conducted under international supervision, ensuring that it is transparent, fair, and free from external influence. The 10-year conflict freeze will ensure that the region is economically stable and fully reconstructed before this vote takes place.

d) Restrictions on Foreign Investment and Ownership

To maintain the economic integrity of the region during this sensitive period, no foreign investors apart from Russian citizens and Ukrainian citizens will be allowed to purchase land in the southern territories during the 10-year period. Additionally, foreign investors (other than Russian or Ukrainian entities) will not be allowed to own more than 25% stake in companies registered in these regions. This measure ensures that the economic

development of the southern territories remains under the influence of local and regional stakeholders, preventing external exploitation and maintaining sovereignty over land and resources. Foreign investors will be allowed to purchase fixed income assets issued by the companies registered in DMZ regions.

e) No Taxation and Transparent Use of Reconstruction Funds

During the conflict freeze, no taxes shall be collected by either Russia or Ukraine from these territories. The absence of taxation guarantees that the local population will not bear the financial burden of reconstruction, which will be funded entirely through the Reconstruction Fund. This ensures that the financial resources intended for rebuilding are transparently allocated and used for the benefit of the region's recovery, without interference or diversion by either party.

f) Sevastopol Port – Shared Naval Use

The Sevastopol Port shall be jointly administered by Russia and Ukraine during the conflict freeze, allowing both nations to maintain naval operations in the Black Sea. A joint commission with oversight from international mediators will ensure the safe and equal use of the port by both navies, maintaining regional stability without unilateral control.

g) Environmental and Legal Protections

In addition to economic and military neutrality, environmental restoration efforts shall be prioritized, including demining, reforestation, and water system rehabilitation. Legal protections will be in place to ensure that both Russia and Ukraine respect the political neutrality of the region, and any attempts to exert political influence or control will be met with international penalties.

h) Cultural and Educational Initiatives

During the 10-year conflict freeze, special attention shall be given to cultural and educational initiatives aimed at fostering understanding and cooperation between the



populations of Russia and Ukraine. A key component of this initiative will be ensuring that children in the southern territories are taught both Russian and Ukrainian in schools, promoting bilingualism and mutual respect for both cultures.

10. Inclusion of Additional Parties in Phase III Negotiations

As we transition into Phase III of the peace negotiations, the International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI) recognizes the importance of involving a broader range of stakeholders to ensure the sustainability of peace and to address the complexities of the conflict. Accordingly, parties that were previously excluded from negotiations in Phases I and II will now be invited to participate. This expanded participation will include regional actors, neighbouring states,

and relevant international organizations that have a vested interest in the peace and stability of Eastern Europe. These parties will contribute to the discussion on long-term security frameworks, reconstruction efforts, and economic recovery. Their inclusion aims to create a more comprehensive and multilateral approach to conflict resolution, ensuring that the interests of all affected parties are considered and that the peace agreements are more robust and durable

11. New Phase of Negotiations and Preparation for Long-Term Agreements for Phase IV

As part of Phase III, both parties shall engage in a new round of negotiations aimed at establishing comprehensive agreements that will pave the way for long-term regional stability. These negotiations will focus on the following key areas:

a) Cessation of Previous Agreements

Both Russia and Ukraine will formally agree to terminate outdated agreements, including the Warsaw Pact and Minsk Agreements, to clear the path for a new Eastern European security framework. This will establish a fresh foundation for peace negotiations that reflect the current geopolitical realities and security concerns.

b) Black Sea Security Agreements

The Black Sea plays a critical role in regional security and economic stability, making it essential to secure safe passage for civilian, commercial, and energy-related vessels. A regional security pact shall be established to ensure the freedom of navigation and protect vital maritime routes for both Russia and Ukraine, with special emphasis on energy resources, food supplies, and military coordination.



Guarantees for Freedom of Navigation:

- Both parties shall commit to securing passage for all civilian and commercial vessels in the Black Sea, ensuring that no boat carrying energy, grain, wheat, or other critical supplies is attacked or obstructed.
- The agreement will include monitoring and enforcement mechanisms led by international observers, such as the United Nations, OSCE, and International Maritime Organization (IMO), to ensure compliance and provide immediate assistance in case of violations.

Shared Use of Sevastopol Military Port:

- The Sevastopol military port will be jointly leased and administered by both Russia and Ukraine, with a 100-year lease agreement guaranteeing its shared use. Both parties will commit to maintaining the port for non-aggressive, defensive purposes.
- A Joint Sevastopol Commission, composed of representatives from both countries and neutral parties, will oversee operations, maintenance, and the joint use of the port for maritime defense while preventing any unilateral military escalations.

Oil and Gas Deposits in the Sea of Azov:

- For the next 10 years, neither Russia nor Ukraine will access or exploit the oil and gas deposits in the Sea of Azov. These resources will remain off-limits, and exploration or extraction will be strictly prohibited.
- After the self-determination vote in 2035 in the southern territories, all energy assets and commodities located in the region, including the Sea of Azov, can be renegotiated under new terms reflecting the political status determined by the vote.
- International observers, along with environmental agencies and energy security experts, will monitor the region to ensure compliance with this agreement and prevent unauthorized exploitation of resources.

c) Energy Security Agreements

Energy security is critical to ensuring the long-term stability and recovery of both Ukraine and Russia. A comprehensive set of Energy Security Accords shall be developed, focusing on protecting critical infrastructure, promoting renewable energy investments, and securing uninterrupted energy trade between both nations and the broader European market.



Safeguarding Energy Infrastructure:

- Both parties must agree to halt all attacks on oil refineries, gas storage facilities, pipelines, nuclear power plants and electric power plants. This includes a commitment to protect these assets from sabotage or cyberattacks, with international observers monitoring compliance.
- Energy companies operating in these regions must integrate AI-based sensor threat detection, cybersecurity systems, and satellite monitoring as part of their operational protocols. These technologies will be essential for ensuring real-time oversight of energy infrastructure and mitigating risks of sabotage, cyberattacks, or other threats. IRBAI will provide companies with the technical specifications, software packets, and operational requirements for AI systems and satellite monitoring to ensure that these solutions are effective, transparent, and secure.
- IRBAI's Cybersecurity Team will provide cybersecurity protection from potential attacks, and all data necessary for national investigations. From time-to-time IRBAI will conduct AI penetration tests and simulate cyber incidents to ensure that AI-driven cybersecurity measures are effective, and energy sector is protected.

Protection and Monitoring of Nuclear Power Plants

- All nuclear power plants, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, will be designated as protected zones under the agreement, with a 50-kilometer demilitarized perimeter enforced around each nuclear facility. No military equipment will be allowed within these perimeters, apart from jamming drones.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with UN, will oversee the monitoring and safety of nuclear power plants. This will include regular safety inspections, radiation monitoring, and emergency response drills to prevent accidents and ensure compliance with international safety standards.
- IRBAI's Cybersecurity Team will provide cybersecurity protection from potential attacks, and all data necessary for national investigations.
- Both Russia and Ukraine will commit to full transparency with the IAEA and IRBAI, providing unfettered access to inspectors and adhering to all international nuclear safety protocols.
- IRBAI will conduct AI penetration tests and simulate cyber incidents to ensure that AI-driven cybersecurity measures are effective, and no external actors are accessing the internal systems.

Mechanisms for Energy Trade Restoration:

- Following compliance with Phases I and II, the energy trade between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe shall be gradually restored within 90 days, with sanctions



relief tied to compliance. Agreements to reopen some pipelines passing through Ukraine or Poland are necessary. PGING and Gazprom shall facilitate the negotiations first.

- Both countries will commit to maintaining stable energy supply chains, with energy routes such as pipelines and electricity grids being secured and monitored by both Parties.
- In the event of geopolitical tensions or external threats, the agreement will establish response mechanisms to minimize disruptions in energy supplies and prevent damage to critical infrastructure.

12. Security Framework NATO- Russia-Ukraine

As part of the Peace Proposal, IRBAI is recommending an updated **security framework between NATO, Ukraine and Russia**, designed to de-escalate military activities in Eastern Europe and promote sustainable peace. We propose that Parties will focus on the following key points:

a) NATO's Non-Expansion and Ukrainian Sovereignty

- We propose that NATO will formally commit to a legally binding non-expansion agreement, ensuring that neither Ukraine nor Georgia will join the alliance for the foreseeable future. This addresses Russia's security concerns and will contribute to de-escalating tensions in the region.
- In return, Russia shall commit to respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and refrain from any military actions within Ukraine's recognized borders, including all demilitarized zones (DMZs), ensuring that Ukraine's territorial integrity is protected.
- Both Ukraine and Russia shall agree to a mutual no-military build-up within 250 kilometres of their shared borders.
- A joint IRBAI-NATO-Russia-Ukraine security commission shall oversee compliance, mediate disputes, and ensure that any potential security threats are addressed through diplomatic channels.

b) Limiting Military Exercises in the Black Sea

- We propose that NATO military exercises in the Black Sea region be restricted and only allowed if all key regional stakeholders—including Russia, Romania, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine—agree to the activity. This measure will ensure that no unilateral military actions are taken that could escalate tensions in the region.
- In the absence of unanimous agreement, no NATO military exercises shall be permitted.
- If allowed, all military exercises must be transparent, pre-announced, and subject to international oversight, ensuring that any activities are purely defensive.



c) Limiting Military Exercises in the Arctic

- We propose that military exercises conducted by NATO and Russia in the Arctic region be limited and contingent upon mutual agreement among all relevant parties, including Arctic Council members and neighbouring states. This collaborative approach will help mitigate the potential for misunderstandings and escalations in this strategically sensitive area.
- In the absence of a consensus among Arctic stakeholders, no military exercises shall be permitted.
- If exercises are authorized, they must be conducted transparently, with advance notice provided to all parties involved. Furthermore, these exercises should be monitored by independent international observers to ensure compliance with defensive operational mandates and to foster trust among nations in the region.

d) Buffer Zone for Long-Range Missiles

- IRBAI proposes the creation of a 2000km buffer zone between Russia and NATO for the deployment of long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. This buffer will act as a safeguard to prevent the immediate threat posed by such weapons being stationed near borders.
- Both NATO and Russia shall further commit to a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and agree to non-nuclear deterrence measures. It is important to ensure that military engagement remains controlled and does not escalate into nuclear conflict.

e) Limiting Naval Presence Near Energy Infrastructure

- In response to the recent sabotage allegations of the Nord Stream pipelines, we propose that NATO and Russia agree to limit military naval operations within a 100-kilometer radius of critical energy infrastructure, such as pipelines and undersea cables, located in the Baltic Sea and other strategic waters.
- U.S. naval presence near Russian or European energy infrastructure shall be restricted to ensure no repeat incidents of sabotage. Any naval activities in these zones must be pre-approved and closely monitored by international observers, with advance notifications to both NATO and Russia.

13. Nuclear Weapons: International Accords

IRBAI proposes that all parties possessing, acquiring or developing nuclear weapons—including Russia, the USA, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Australia, North Korea, Israel, Iran, and NATO nuclear-sharing states (Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Turkey) must actively engage in a comprehensive agreement focused on:



- a) Renewing and reinforcing the international commitment to the previous Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- b) Setting specific timetables for reducing stockpiles of nuclear warheads
- c) Banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in conflict zones and establishing strict international monitoring of nuclear facilities.
- d) Strengthening the international mechanisms for preventing nuclear proliferation, ensuring that all states maintain secure control over their arsenals, preventing unauthorized use or access to nuclear materials.

These accords shall be negotiated with active involvement from the United Nations, IRBAI, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to ensure that all participating nations remain committed to global nuclear security and peace. Additionally, the accords will stipulate that AI technologies shall not be utilized in the automation or operation of nuclear weapons systems, ensuring strict human oversight to prevent unintended escalation or conflict.

These efforts are particularly relevant to the current geopolitical climate in Eastern Europe, where the risk of nuclear escalation remains a pressing concern.

14. Negotiations on War Damages and Establishment of a Reconstruction Fund

Both parties shall initiate negotiations to assess and address the damages caused by the conflict, with the aim of preparing for repatriations and the establishment of a reconstruction fund. To facilitate these discussions, the parties will begin estimating financial losses in the following key categories:

- a) Energy Infrastructure:
 - Power plants (nuclear, thermal, hydroelectric)
 - Electric grid stations and power transmission lines
 - Pipelines (gas, oil, and water) and oil refineries
- b) Water Supply and Sanitation Systems:
 - Water treatment plants
 - Pumping stations
- c) Healthcare Facilities:
 - Hospitals, clinics, and emergency care centers
- d) Education and Cultural Sites:
 - Schools, universities, and places of worship



e) Residential Areas:

- Housing complexes and temporary shelters for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

f) Infrastructure and Communications:

- Transport routes (airports, railways, bridges)

g) Economic Impact:

- Loss of foreign investment, reduced economic growth, and decreased energy export revenues due to sanctions
- Sanctioned assets and asset freezes
- SWIFT Access
- Currency devaluation and inflation

15. Compliance and Sanction Relief Strategy

In Phase I, the gradual restoration of SWIFT access for the Russian banking system within the European Union was initiated, contingent upon a 90-day compliance period following the completion of the 45-day Phase I implementation. Building on this, Phase III will focus on expanding Russia's access to SWIFT in the U.S. and other global markets, as well as defreezing all Russian assets held by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the European Union, and other sanctioning bodies. These measures are essential to facilitate the funding of the Reconstruction Fund for both Ukraine and Russia, ensuring that both nations can begin the process of economic recovery and infrastructure rebuilding.

The defreezing of assets and full reintegration into international banking systems will allow Russia to address significant financial losses due to the cut from export markets, the destruction of the Nord Stream Pipelines, reduced foreign investment, and the broader economic downturn caused by sanctions. Simultaneously, this strategy will enable Russia to contribute to reconstruction efforts while stabilizing its economy and energy export revenues.

In parallel, Ukraine's economic recovery will be supported by its integration into the European Union and direct funding from the United States, which will transition from providing military aid to economic assistance, accordingly, to Phase I proposal. This shift will allow Ukraine to finance the rebuilding of critical infrastructure and social services, further reducing its dependence on weapons-related funds.

As part of the broader sanctions' relief strategy, final decisions on asset defreezing and financial access will be closely tied to the outcomes of the Negotiations on War Damages and the Establishment of a Reconstruction Fund by Russia and Ukraine. Once the costs of war in Ukraine and Russia have been approximated and a structured plan for repatriations and reconstruction is agreed upon, both nations will be positioned to address the long-term economic impacts of the conflict, ensuring sustainable recovery.



Monitoring and Compliance Mechanisms

Sanction relief will be phased and monitored by international entities such as the IMF, World Bank, and IRBAI. AI-driven oversight of demilitarized zones and regular compliance reports will ensure that financial assets are used for rebuilding civilian infrastructure, restoring critical services, and supporting humanitarian efforts. Non-compliance with ceasefire agreements or misuse of funds will result in the immediate reinstatement of sanctions.

16. Establishment of an International Tribunal for War Crimes

As part of the peace proposal, it is essential to address war crimes committed during the Russia-Ukraine conflict to ensure accountability, justice for victims, and long-term reconciliation. The establishment of an International Tribunal for War Crimes, overseen by impartial international bodies, will provide a framework for investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating war crimes committed by all parties involved in the conflict.

a) Formation of the Tribunal

- The tribunal shall be established through a resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or an independent initiative led by neutral international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a specially formed body under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
- Impartial judges from neutral countries, as well as representatives from international human rights organizations, shall form the core of the tribunal to ensure fairness and transparency.

b) Jurisdiction and Scope

- The tribunal shall have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and any acts of genocide committed by either Russian or Ukrainian military forces, paramilitary groups, or third-party actors.
- It shall also investigate violations of international humanitarian law, such as deliberate attacks on civilians, torture, unlawful deportation, and the use of prohibited weapons (e.g., chemical or cluster munitions).
- Both Ukraine and Russia will be required to fully cooperate with the tribunal by providing access to relevant military records, facilitating investigations, and handing over any individuals accused of war crimes.



Future Phases (IV, V, and VI)

Upon the successful implementation of Phases I, II, and III, and after the finalization of negotiations during Phase III, the International Regulatory Body for AI (IRBAI) will prepare and submit a comprehensive proposal for Phases IV, V, and VI. These future phases will focus on the long-term stabilization of the region, including further demilitarization, economic recovery, cultural reconciliation, and self-determination. The specifics of these phases will be determined in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, based on the evolving situation on the ground.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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Joanna Accordi, Chair
International Regulatory Body for AI